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Chapter 15
Representation of the Antebellum South 
in the House of Representatives: Measuring 
the Impact of the Three-Fifths Clause
BRIAN D. HUMES, ELAINE K. SWIFT, 
RICHARD M. VALELLY, KENNETH FINEGOLD, 
AND EVELYN C. FINK
During the Constitutional Convention, Southern ambivalence toward the 
Constitution was resolved through a number of sectional compromises. One 
of the most important was the three-fifths clause” of Article 1, which pro­
vided that three-fifths of aU slaves be counted as part of a state’s population 
when apportioning congressional seats. The clause reads as follows:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the sev­
eral States which may be included within this Union, according to 
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for 
a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of aU 
other Persons.
Enforcement of this clause enabled the South to receive significantly more 
House seats than would have been the case had it been apportioned on the 
same basis as the North. This malapportionment in turn created ripple ef­
fects inside and outside the institution, further magnifying the section’s seat 
advantage.'
Between 1795 and 1861, the three-fifths clause openly and systematically 
gave the South a disproportionate share of seats in the House. This over­
representation allowed Southerners to wield tremendous power over House 
decisions; in addition to influencing legislative battles, the clause also af-
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fected the outcomes of two critical presidential elections. Thus it played an 
important part in shaping the course of antebellum U.S. history.
In this chapter, we advance two counterfactual thought experiments as a 
means of measuring the impact of the three-fifths clause.^ In our first coun­
terfactual, we estimate how representatives would have been apportioned in 
the antebellum era if slaves in the South had not been counted for purposes 
of apportionment. We then apply these apportionment figures in several 
ways. First, we look at roU call votes in the House, presenting data on the 
number of outcomes altered by the enforcement of the three-fifths clause. 
Next, we look to see whether any “major” legislation that passed during this 
period would have been defeated. Finally, we examine the collateral effects 
of the clause on the electoral college.
In our second counterfactual, we imagine an antebellum United States 
where slaves were counted in the same way as women and children. That is, 
we count slaves as whole persons for the purpose of apportionment.^ We 
then repeat the analysis of the first counterfactual, looking at both the num­
ber of roU caU vote outcomes altered and the coUateral effects of the clause 
on the electoral coUege. Whereas both counterfactuals yield significant departures 
from the historical record, our first counterfactual represents a more drastic change from 
actual outcomes. Had slaves not been counted for purposes of apportionment 
of House seats in the antebeUum South, nearly half of the roU caU votes 
could have had different outcomes, including a number of “major” pieces of 
legislation. Further, we find that the outcomes of two critical presidential 
elections—-1800 and 1824—would likely have been reversed without the 
enforcement of the three-fifths clause.
To conclude, however, that these findings represent the actual effect of the 
three-fifths clause would require the strong assumption that aside from the 
method of counting blacks, aU else would have remained constant. In par­
ticular, three aspects of the lawmaking process—the types of Southern rep­
resentatives elected, the way those representatives voted, and the legislative 
agenda—would have to have been the same in order for our counterfactu­
als to accurately portray the alternative outcomes that would have been ob­
tained without the three-fifths clause (see Appendixes A and B to this chap­
ter for further discussion of our assumptions). We do not assert that all else 
would have been constant. Rather, the findings in this chapter should be 
understood as the maximum possible effect of the three-fifths clause. We 
contend that the magnitude of our results, particularly in the first counter- 
factual, demonstrates a clear and substantial effect.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, we show how the apportionment
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of House seats would have changed if slaves had not been counted for ap­
portionment. Next, based on the new apportionment, we predict the out­
comes of all roll call votes in the House from 1795 to 1861, followed by a 
more specific investigation of some of the major legislation of that era. We 
then turn to our second counterfactual and again perform an analysis of leg­
islative outcomes between 1795 and 1861. Following that, we apply both of 
our counterfactual apportioning procedures to the electoral college and look 
at how each might have changed the outcomes of presidential elections.
Counteifactual 1: Slaves Are Not Counted for Apportionment Purposes
In order to estimate the South’s gains from the three-fifths clause, we must 
first define what constituted the South in antebellum politics. Although the 
postbellum South was, and is, commonly defined as the former states of the 
Confederacy (Black and Black 1992; Key 1984; Kousser 1974), antebellum 
political actors included other states—typically border states with significant 
slave populations in their view of that region. Adopting the construction 
of contemporaries, we define the South as the “slave states “ that Congress 
sought to evenly balance with “free states” in the composition of the ante­
bellum Senate: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, South Caro­
lina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia (Swift 1996: 108-110).
CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT
In Appendix A, we detail our methods for assessing the number of repre­
sentatives the South gained from the three-fifths clause. Here, suffice it to 
say that in apportioning seats to Southern states, we applied the same for­
mulas used to allot House members to Northern states. Table 15.1 presents 
our results. The three-fifths clause awarded the South significant extra rep­
resentation. Between the 4th (1795-97) and 36th (1859-61) Congresses, 
the South gained anywhere from 14 to 30 seats per Congress, with an aver­
age gain of 20 seats.
Further, the seats the South gained from the three-fifths clause were fairly 
evenly distributed between the parties of the period. In sharp contrast to the 
Solid Democratic South that would take root in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, the antebellum period was far more competitive, 
particularly after the emergence of the Jacksonian Democrats and the Whigs. 
Unsurprisingly, then, our estimates of the impact of the clause on party and 
factional strength show that it had limited impact on their relative propor­
tions in the House.'* In the 4th through 17th Congresses (1795-1823), the
Table 15.1
Impact of the Three-Fifths Clause on Slave and Nonslave State Representation, 4th—36th Congresses (1795—1861)
Census Used for 
Apportionment
Congresses
Affected
WITH THREE--FIFTHS CLAUSE WITH SLAVES NOT COUNTED*'
Slave State 
Gains from 
Three Fifths 
ClauseSlave States’ Nonslave States’’ Slave States’’ Nonslave States’’
1790 4th-7th 49 57 35 56 14
(46.2%) (53.8%) (38.5%) (61.5%) (7.7%)
1800 8th-12th 66 77 50 77 16
(46.2%) (53.8%) (39.4%) (60.6%) (6.8%)
1810 13th-17th 81 105 63 104 18
(43.5%) (56.5%) (37.7%) (62.3%) (5.6%)
1820 18th—22nd 90 123 68 123 22
(42.3%) (57.7%) (35.6%) (64.4%) (6.7%)
1830 23rd-27th 100 142 75 142 25
(41.3%) (58.7%) (34.6%) (65.4%) (6.7%)
1840 28th-32nd 89 143 74 154 15
(38.4%) (61.6%) (32.5%) (67.5%) (6.1%)
1850 33rd—36th 95 132 75 152 30
(41.8%) (58.2%) (33.1%) (66.9%) (12.6%)
'^See Appendix A for the method by which representation was estimated in the absence of the three-fifths clause.
^ Slave and nonslave states were defined by the antebellum conventions used to balance representation of these interests in the U.S. Senate (Swift 1996). 
The following were considered slave states: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
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JefFersonian Republicans gained 1.1 percent more adherents, while the Fed­
eralists lost the same proportion. In the 18th through 24th Congresses 
(1823—37), a period marked by competition between an emerging Jackson­
ian party and less organized anti-Jacksonian factions, the Jacksonians gained 
just 0.7 percent more seats, while the opposition lost 1.6 percent. From the 
25th through 33rd Congresses (1837—55), the high tide of competition be­
tween the Jacksonians and the Whigs, the former gained 0.9 percent more 
seats, while the latter lost 1 percent.^
LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES
The South’s inflated House delegation made its numbers felt in legislative 
outcomes. As Table 15.2 shows, we find that the clause changed the results 
in 41.3 percent of the roll calls in the antebellum period, changing winning 
coahtions into losers and losing coahtions into winners (see Appendix B for 
a discussion of the procedures behind these results). The percentage of roll 
calls that changed ranges from 26.3 percent in the 34th Congress (1859—61) 
to 55.3 percent in the 6th Congress (1799—1801). Analyzing the roll call re­
sults on a decade-by-decade basis, we find that the clause affected almost half 
of the roll calls in the 1790s; the proportion of bills affected is 28.9 percent 
in the first decade of the 1800s, 37.8 percent in the 1810s, and 36.5 percent 
in the 1820s. This figure then increases, peaking at 51 percent in the 1840s. 
While these numbers seem to show a trend in the clause’s impact, there is a 
considerable amount of variation within each decade. However, it is clear 
from this analysis that a large number of roll call votes were affected.*
Our analysis further suggests that the South’s bonus seats had an impact 
on a wider variety of issues than just those traditionally associated with the 
region, including government management, social welfare, agricultural as­
sistance, civil liberties, and international involvement. We found that there 
is little variation in the degree to which the clause reversed outcomes in each 
of the categories.
Of course, one might inquire whether these were important votes or not. 
Although we cannot directly answer this question, we can begin to address 
it by looking at the impact of the three-fifths clause on major legislation. We 
use Dell and Stathis (1982) to identify important measures in each Congress 
from the 4th through the 36th.^ For each Congress, Dell and Stathis iden­
tify two to six pieces of legislation. A large number of the measures 
identified did not have recorded votes on final passage. However, this hst is 
not intended as an exhaustive analysis. Rather it is presented as an illustra­
tion of the types of measures that could have been defeated with a change in 
apportionment. For measures where there are final recorded votes, we note
Table 15.2
Roll Call Votes Affected by the Three-Fifths Clause, 
4th—36th Congresses (1795—1861)
Percentage of
Congress (years) Affected Votes Total Votes Votes Affected
4 (1795-1797) 25 83 30.1
5 (1797-1799) 86 155 55.5
6 (1799-1801) 54 96 56.3
7 (1801-1803) 44 142 31.0
8 (1803-1805) 41 132 31.1
9 (1805-1807) 52 158 32.9
10 (1807-1809) 54 237 22.8
11 (1809-1811) 77 293 26.3
12 (1811-1813) 97 314 30.9
13 (1813-1815) 112 352 31.8
14 (1815-1817) 41 113 36.3
15 (1817-1819) 48 106 45.3
16 (1819-1821) 66 147 44.9
17 (1821-1823) 26 95 27.4
18 (1823-1825) 40 94 42.6
19 (1825-1827) 49 111 44.1
20 (1827-1829) 76 233 32.6
21 (1829-1831) 98 273 35.9
22 (1831-1833) 212 462 45.9
23 (1833-1835) 138 327 42.2
24 (1835-1837) 150 459 32.7
25 (1837-1839) 197 475 41.5
26 (1839-1841) 327 751 43.5
27 (1841-1843) 474 974 48.7
28 (1843-1845) 278 597 46.6
29 (1845-1847) 331 642 51.6
30 (1847-1849) 273 478 57.1
31 (1849-1851) 293 572 51.2
32 (1851-1853) 239 455 52.5
33 (1853-1855) 290 607 47.8
34 (1855-1857) 403 729 55.3
35 (1857-1859) 274 548 50.0
36 (1859-1861) 167 433 38.6
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the measures that could have been defeated if the South did not receive ap­
portionment based on its slaves. The measures discussed here are the only 
ones that are identified by Dell and Stathis for which a roll call vote was 
taken on final passage.
In the 4th through 6th Congresses, five measures would have been de­
feated with a change in apportionment. In the 5th Congress, there were 
three measures: an act to establish a Department of the Navy, the AHen Act, 
and the Sedition Act. The latter two acts were parts of the Ahen and Se­
dition Acts that encouraged and reinforced in the spUt between the Fed­
eralists and the Jeffersonian Repubhcans. In the 6th Congress, a change in 
apportionment would have resulted in the defeat of the First Federal Bank­
ruptcy Law and the Judiciary Act of 1801. The latter act reduced the num­
ber of Supreme Court justices from six to five, increased the number of dis­
trict courts, and established six circuit courts.
In the 7th through 11th Congresses, there were only two acts that would 
have been defeated. Both occurred in the 9th Congress: the Cumberland 
Road Act and the Judiciary Act of 1807. The former was the first major in­
ternal improvement project funded by the federal government and created 
the most important route for immigration to the Northwest until 1840. The 
latter increased the number of Supreme Court justices from six to seven.
In the 12 th through 16 th Congresses, only one major piece of legislation 
would have been affected. In the Nth Congress, the Second National Bank 
of the United States was established. The creation of the bank, of course, led 
to major pohtical battles in the 1830s between President Jackson and the 
supporters of the National Bank.
In the 17th through 21st Congresses, only the Indian Removal Act, 
passed in the 21st Congress, met our criteria. This act arranged for the re­
moval of Native Americans to lands west of the Mississippi. It resulted in the 
forcible relocation of the Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, Cherokees, and 
Seminoles to present-day Oklahoma. Thus this act authorized what is now 
referred to as the “Trail of Tears.”
In the 22nd through 26th Congresses, only one act would have been af­
fected. This was the Tariff Act of 1832, passed in the 22nd Congress. This 
act was expected to appease the antiprotectionist South. However, soon af­
ter its passage. South CaroHna adopted the Ordinance of Nullification. This 
resulted in President Jackson’s call for a “force biU.”
In the 27th through 31st Congresses, two pieces of legislation would have 
been affected, both in the 31st Congress. The Texas and New Mexico Act 
established boundaries between the United States and Texas, compensated 
Texas for relinquishing claims to New Mexico, and made provisions to al-
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low the citizens of New Mexico to decide if it would be admitted as a slave 
state or a free state. The Utah Act estabUshed the boundaries of that state 
and let its voters decide whether it was to be a free or slave state.
In the 32nd through 36th Congresses, only the English BiU passed in the 
34th Congress with a sufficiendy small margin that it could have been de­
feated without the three-fifths clause. This bill concerned the admission of 
Kansas to the statehood. It stated that Kansas would be admitted imme­
diately if its citizens accepted the Lecompton Constitution. If its citizens 
rejected this measure, the state would not be admitted until it met the 
minimal size required for apportionment of a member of the House of 
Representatives.
The foregoing discussion clearly shows that pohcy was affected by the 
three-fifths clause. We have shown that the outcomes of numerous votes 
would have changed had apportionment been done without counting slaves 
as part of a state’s population. We have also shown that several important 
pieces of legislation would have been defeated without the additional repre­
sentation given to the South through the implementation of the clause. Al­
though some of these measures were not as important as others, some clearly 
defined the pohtical landscape of the time. As such, it is clear that the North 
yielded something real to the South when it agreed to the three-fifths clause.
Counterfactual 2: Slaves Count as Whole Persons 
for Apportionment Purposes
Of course, because the three-fifths clause was a compromise, the South also 
made concessions to the North; let us now consider what the South yielded 
when it agreed to the compromise by examining what would have happened 
if slaves had been counted as whole persons for apportionment purposes.
CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT
We repeat our earher analysis, with one change. Instead of not counting 
slaves toward apportionment at aU, we count slaves as whole persons. Except 
for the weightings, the process is identical to that discussed earher and in Ap­
pendix A.
Table 15.3 presents our results. As we can see, the three-fifths clause re­
duced the proportion of seats awarded to the South. Between the 4th (1795 — 
97) and 36th (1859—61) Congresses, the South lost anywhere from 6 to 15 
seats, with an average loss of 10.9 seats.
Once again, the seats that the South lost from the three-fifths clause were 
fairly evenly distributed between the parties of the period. Unsurprisingly,
Table 15.3
Impact of the Three-Fifths Clause on Slave and Nonslave State Representation, 
4th-36th Congresses (1795-1861), with Slaves Counted as Whole Persons
Census Used for 
Apportionment
Congresses
Affected
WITH THREE--FIFTHS CLAUSE WITH SLAVES NOT COUNTED"
Slave State 
Gains from 
Three Fifths 
Clauseslave States'’ Nonslave States'’ Slave States'’ Nonslave States^
1790 4th-7th 49 57 55 57 6
(46.2%) (53.8%) (49.1%) (50.9%) (5.7%)
1800 8th-12th 66 77 75 77 9
(46.2%) (53.8%) (49.3%) (50.7%) (13.6%)
1810 13th-17th 81 105 95 106 14
(43.5%) (56.5%) (47.3%) (52.7%) (17.2%)
1820 18 th—22nd 90 123 104 123 14
(42.3%) (57.7%) (45.8%) (54.2%) (15.6%)
1830 23rd-27th 100 142 115 142 15
(41.3%) (58.7%) (34.6%) (65.4%) (15.0%)
1840 28th-32nd 89 143 100 137 11
(38.4%) (61.6%) (44.7%) (55.3%) (12.4%)
1850 33rd-36th 90 132 97 125 7
(40.5%) (59.5%) (43.7%) (56.3%) (7.8%)
‘’See Appendix A for the method by which representation was estimated in the absence of the three-fifths clause.
*Slave and nonslave states were defined by the antebellum conventions used to balance representation of these interests in the U.S. Senate (Swift 1996). 
The following were considered slave states: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North 
Carohna, South CaroUna, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
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then, our estimates of the impact of the clause on party and factional 
strength show that it had limited impact on their relative proportions in the 
House.*
LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES
The South’s deflated delegation weakened its influence on legislative out­
comes. As Table 15.4 shows, we find that the clause changed the results in 
26.3 percent of the roll calls in the antebellum period (again, see Appendix 
B for a discussion of the procedures behind these results). The percentage of 
roll calls affected ranges between 10.8 percent in the 4th Congress (1795 — 
97) to 36.2 percent in the 18th (1823—25). Decade by decade, the pattern 
is as follows; the clause affected almost one-quarter of the roll calls in the 
1790s, 22.1 percent of its roll calls in the next decade, and 29.7 percent in 
the 1810s, which is the high point of the number of roll calls affected; the 
level declined to 25.7 percent in the 1820s and rose slightly to 27 percent in 
the 1830s and 27.5 percent in the 1840s and 1850s. While these numbers 
seem to show a sHght trend in the clause’s impact, there is a considerable 
amount of variation within each decade. However, it is clear from this 
analysis that a significant number of roll call votes were affected.^
As in our first counterfactual, further analysis suggests that the South’s loss 
of seats had an impact on a wider variety of issues than just those tradition­
ally associated with the region. Looking at the same issue areas—govern­
ment management, social welfare, agricultural assistance, civil liberties, and 
international involvement—we again found httle variation in the degree to 
which the clause reversed outcomes in each of the categories.
Collateral Effects of the Three-Fifths Clause
House apportionments determine the size of a state’s delegation in Con­
gress, as well as the size of its delegation in the electoral college.'® The South 
therefore reaped dividends from the enforcement of the three-fifths clause 
not only in its number of representatives but also in the number of its elec­
tors. In general, the clause increased the importance of the South in presi­
dential contests, inflating the extent to which the region had to be courted 
in order to secure an electoral college victory. As we can see from Table 
15.5, the impact of the three-fifths clause on the electoral college was espe­
cially important in the formative stages of the first party system, afford­
ing a decisive advantage to the Jeffersonians, who were stronger in the 
South. Moreover, it undoubtedly encouraged that party to maintain its
Table 15.4
Roll Call Votes Affected by the Three-Fifths Clause, 
4th-36th Congresses (1795-1861) with Slaves Fully Counted
Percentage of
Congress (years) Affected Votes Total Votes Votes Affect
4 (1795-1797) 9 83 10.8
5 (1797-1799) 46 155 29.7
6 (1799-1801) 34 96 35.4
7 (1801-1803) 24 142 16.9
8 (1803-1805) 27 132 20.5
9 (1805-1807) 31 158 32.9
10 (1807-1809) 23 237 19.6
11 (1809-1811) 46 293 15.7
12 (1811-1813) 56 314 17.8
13 (1813-1815) 87 352 24.7
14 (1815-1817) 33 113 29.2
15 (1817-1819) 44 106 41.5
16 (1819-1821) 52 147 35.4
17 (1821-1823) 17 95 17.9
18 (1823-1825) 34 94 36.2
19 (1825-1827) 36 111 32.4
20 (1827-1829) 49 233 21.0
21 (1829-1831) 57 273 20.8
22 (1831-1833) 140 462 30.3
23 (1833-1835) 97 327 29.7
24 (1835-1837) 88 459 19.2
25 (1837-1839) 129 475 27.2
26 (1839-1841) 214 751 28.5
27 (1841-1843) 320 974 32.9
28 (1843-1845) 140 597 23.5
29 (1845-1847) 166 642 25.9
30 (1847-1849) 143 478 29.9
31 (1849-1851) 145 572 25.3
32 (1851-1853) 106 455 23.3
33 (1853-1855) 149 607 24.5
34 (1855-1857) 263 729 36.1
35 (1857-1859) 184 548 33.6
36 (1859-1861) 88 433 20.3
Table 15.5
Impact of the Three-Fifths Clause on the Electoral College, 1792—1860
Census Used for 
Apportionment
Congresses
Affected
WITH THREE--FIFTHS CLAUSE WITH SLAVES NOT COUNTED
Slave State 
Gains from 
Three Fifths 
Clauseslave States Nonslave States Slave States Nonslave States
1790 4th-7th 65 73 51 72 14
(47.1%) (52.9%) (41.5%) (58.5%) (5.6%)
1800 8th-12th 81 95 65 95 16
(46.0%) (54.0%) (40.6%) (59.4%) (5.4%)
1810 13 th-17 th 103 131 85 130 18
(44.0%) (56.0%) (39.5%) (60.5%) (4.5%)
1820 18th-22nd 114 147 92 147 22
(43.7%) (56.3%) (38.5%) (61.5%) (5.2%)
1830 23rd-27th 126 168 101 168 25
(42.9%) (57.1%) (37.5%) (62.5%) (5.3%)
1840 28th-32nd 117 177 102 291 15
(39.8%) (60.2%) (26.0%) (74.0%) (13.8%)
1850 33rd-36th 135 168 128 175 7
(44.6%) (55.4%) (42.2%) (57.8%) (2.3%)
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Southern roots, which it did by nominating only Southerners as presiden­
tial candidates.
The three-fifths clause not only consistendy strengthened Southern 
influence in presidential contests but also, in two elections, actually altered 
the outcome. These elections were among the most significant of the ante­
bellum period: that of 1800, which set in motion the dominance of the Jef­
fersonian party, and that of 1824, which launched the Jacksonian party.
In the famous election of 1800, Jefferson captured 52.9 percent of the 
electoral coUege votes.” However, had the three-fifths clause not been a fac­
tor, John Adams would have captured 51.5 percent of the electoral college 
and therefore the presidency. >2 The role that the three-fifths clause played in 
Jefferson s narrow victory was weU recognized by contemporaries (see Miller 
1959: 563-64; Lynd 1967: chap. 7). Years later, the memory was still fresh: 
the Federahsts who gathered at the 1814 Hartford Convention had not for­
gotten the devastating impact and included a call for abolition of the clause 
in the first of their reform planks. Abolitionists, too, recognized its 
significance and pointed to the election as an example of how the South 
might sway national politics through what they viewed as an unholy advan­
tage (Lynd 1967: chap. 7).
The role that the clause played in the election of 1824 was subtler but just 
as crucial. In that fractious presidential contest, no candidate won a major­
ity of the electoral college. The House, therefore, had to choose the presi­
dent from among the top three electoral college vote-getters; this meant that 
the fourth-highest vote-getter. Speaker of the House Henry Clay, was elim­
inated from consideration, leaving the House to choose among Andrew 
Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and WiUiam Crawford. Although Clay’s role 
in influencing the ultimate selection of Adams was—and is—disputed, he 
vetted the candidates and played an active role in guiding the House’s selec­
tion (Remini 1991). If the three-fifths clause had not been in effbct, the three 
names forwarded to the House for decision would have been Clay, Adams, 
and Jackson. Given Clay’s strong presidential ambitions and the extent of his 
support in the House, he undoubtedly would have pursued the prize and 
would have had a plausible chance of winning it.^^
What if slaves had been counted as whole persons for the purpose of ap­
portionment? Table 15.6 illustrates the change in representation in the elec­
toral college if slaves had been counted as whole persons. In the first two de­
cades of apportionment, representation of slave states was nearly equal to 
that of nonslave states. Although the margin increased over time, with non­
slave states always dominating the process, this margin would have been 
significantly smaller had slaves been counted as whole persons.
Impact of the Three-Fifths Clause on the Electoral College, 1792—1860, with Slaves Fully Counted
Census Used for Congresses
Apportionment Affected
WITH THREE-FIFTHS CLAUSE
Slave States Nonslave States
WITH SLAVES NOT COUNTED
Slave States Nonslave States
Slave State 
Gains from 
Three Fifths 
Clause
1790 4th-7th 65 73 71 73 6
(47.1%) (52.9%) (48.6%) (51.4%) (8.5%)
1800 8th-12th 81 95 93 95 12
(46.0%) (54.0%) (49.5%) (50.5%) (12.9%)
1810 13th-17th 103 131 117 130 14
(44.0%) (56.0%) (47.4%) (52.6%) (12.0%)
1820 18th-22nd 114 147 128 147 14
(43.7%) (56.3%) (46.5%) (53.5%) (10.9%)
1830 23rd-27th 126 168 147 168 21
(42.9%) (57.1%) (46.7%) (53.3%) (14.3%)
1840 28th-32nd 117 177 128 171 11
(39.8%) (60.2%) (42.8%) (57.2%) (8.6%)
1850 33rd-36th 135 168 142 167 7
(44.6%) (55.4%) (45.9%) (54.1%) (4.9%)
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However, only one election would have been affected by this change. In 
the election of 1796, the order of finish would have been reversed: instead 
of Adams becoming president and Jefferson serving as vice president, Jeffer­
son would have defeated Adams by one vote in the electoral college. With 
the election of Jefferson at that time, it is unhkely that the Federalists would 
have pushed for the Alien and Sedition Acts. Without these acts, one can 
only conjecture about whether or when there would have been a spht be­
tween the Federahsts and the Jeffersonians.
Conclusion
We turn now to a brief recapitulation of our findings. Like many of the au­
thors in this book, we illustrate a way in which a particular institution af­
fected congressional history. We have done so by examining the impact of 
the three-fifths clause of Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution, using two coun- 
terfactual premises about counting slaves for apportionment purposes. Un­
der both counterfactuals, we find that congressional seat apportionment, 
legislative battles, and presidential elections would have differed from those 
that actually occurred. In particular, we find dramatic differences in the first 
counterfactual scenario (slaves are not counted at all), estimating that nearly 
half of all roll call votes would have had different outcomes, including a 
number of pieces of major legislation. In addition, we find under the first 
counterfactual that two crucial presidential elections—those of 1800 and 
1824—would hkely have had different outcomes. Although these findings 
should be taken as a “maximum possible effect” of the three-fifths clause, we 
argue that the magnitude of our results is large enough to substantiate our 
point.
Notes 499
are those where North and South Dakota are treated as distinct territories 
with the population apportioned according to the geographic split that took 
place at admission. The results are robust to treating Dakota as a single terri­
tory and to dropping the Dakotas altogether.
34. Many of specifications of YRSORG were tried, but the natural log fit 
the best. In particular, a quadratic function was fitted, but the squared term 
was small and statistically insignificant.
35. It is also true that territories represented by Republican delegates had 
significantly larger populations {t = 2.54).
36. We should note that Figure 14.11 probably gives an overstated view of 
Republican prescience since many states that defected from the Republicans 
were brought back into the fold by the realignment of 1896.
37. These support scores are calculated simply as the percentage of each set 
of votes each that senator cast with the majority of his party.
Chapter 15
1. The richest vein of research on the three-fifths clause concerns its con­
stitutional origin, with only a small amount of research devoted to its impact 
beyond 1787 (Lynd 1967; Ohline 1971, 1980; Potter 1972; Robinson 1971; 
Simpson 1941).
2. In each counterfactual, to explore the impact of the three-fifths clause, 
we adopt a comparative statics approach. Commonly used by economists but 
increasingly apphed by poHtical scientists, it estimates the impact of an inde­
pendent variable on the dependent variable by holding all other independent 
variables constant. To conduct this historical comparative statics exercise of es­
timating the impact of the three-fifths clause, we adhered as much as possible 
to the minimal-rewrite rule, which calls for “altering as few ‘well-established’ 
historical facts as possible” (Tetlock and Belkin 1996: 18).
3. At first glance, it may seem odd that we would consider this latter al­
ternative. However, one must remember that the three-fifths clause was a 
compromise. Southerners pushed in the Constitutional Convention, briefly 
and unsuccessfully, for apportionment to be based equally on the slave and free 
population. Although this proposal was defeated, it did offer one end of the 
spectrum from which the eventual compromise was developed; the other was 
not counting slaves for apportionment at all. Thus to understand the effects
of the compromise, one must examine both what the South gained and what 
it lost.
4. For brevity, we have chosen not to provide a detailed discussion of the 
impact of the three-fifths clause on poHtical parties since no poHtical party was 
clearly harmed or benefited from the impact of this clause.
5. We use the party and factional identifications made by Martis (1989). 
In the 18th Congress, Jacksonian FederaHsts and Republicans were classified
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as Jacksonians. All Adams- and Crawford-affiliated factions were classified as 
anti-Jacksonians. In later Congresses, anti-Masonics, NuUifiers, and Whigs 
were classified as anti-Jacksonians. Majority party and factional percentages are 
affected by rounding and by the presence of minor party and faction members 
that fall outside of the dominant pro- and anti-Jefferson and pro- and anti- 
Jacksonian cleavages of the period.
6. We make no attempt to distinguish between types of votes here (votes 
on final passage, procedural issues, amendments, etc.), for two reasons. First, 
ehminating all votes but those on final passage would leave very few votes to 
examine during this era. And second, although some of the votes included in 
our analysis might have been frivolous or dilatory, we have no way of judging 
this without studying the circumstances of each vote carefully. Since we can­
not reasonably make such judgments, we have decided to include aU roll call 
votes in the analysis. However, some of the more obvious purely procedural 
roll calls are eliminated through Clausen’s (1973) coding scheme.
7. These authors note only major pieces of legislation that passed. How­
ever, it is clearly the case that if these measures had been defeated in the 
House, national poUcy wotdd have changed, since the measures either had 
passed or eventually passed the Senate. Clearly, some of these measures would 
not have passed if the South had not been overrepresented by the impact of 
the three-fifths clause.
8. See note 4.
9. See note 6.
10. We should also note that national poHtical party conventions for much 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries allocated delegates to states on the 
basis of their electoral college apportionments. However, we do not treat the 
imphcations of the Three-Fifths Clause because in single-ballot conventions, 
their enforcement or nonenforcement did not affect the outcomes, and in 
multiballot conventions, it is difficult to say how they would have affected the 
complex web of timing, dealmaking, momentum, and section-oriented voting 
rules that influenced the nomination process. For the fullest treatment of the 
influence of the South on Repubhcan and Democratic party nominations in 
this era, see Bain (1960) and David, Goldman, and Bain (1960).
11. Aaron Burr, the Jeffersonian Republican’s candidate for vice president, 
captured the same percentage, necessitating a final decision in the House.
12. Adams would have become president, and Thomas Pinckney would 
have become vice president, having received one less electoral vote than 
Adams.
13. By 1824, Clay had already sought the presidency twice and would 
wage aggressive campaigns two more times; also by 1824, he had been elected 
Speaker each of the five nonconsecutive terms he sought the office, and each 
time he won on the first ballot.
